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AGO ltr 8 Mar 1976 ; AGO ltr 8 Mar 1976	

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*A.B.C. D/A ltr, 8 Mar. 76*

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**23 September 1971**

Lessons Learned, Artillery Units 2d Bn, 35th Arty, 2d Bn, 32d Arty, 5th Bn, 2d Arty, and 2d Bn, 12th Arty

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U. S. C., SECTION 793 AND 794. ITS TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

Operational rpt. for period ending 30 Apr 71.

4. As Section 1 of the report is not pertinent to the Lessons Learned program it has been omitted.

(11) May 71

(12) 43 p.

**VERNE L. BOWERS**  
Major General, USA  
The Adjutant General

DDC  
OCT 7 1971  
A

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(Distribution continued on page 2)

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2. Lessons Learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations.

a. Personnel:

(1) **OBSERVATION**: That transfer of non-essential personnel from standdown/redeployed units be expedited to reduce personnel turbulence.

(2) **EVALUATION**: Because the standdown/redeployment operations do not require 100% of authorized strength, the unit's personnel were divided into essential and non-essential categories. Non-essential personnel were offered for reassignment immediately prior to the batteries withdrawing to the rear area. Gaining units were not responsive to reassignment thus contributing to increased personnel turbulence once the forward elements began arriving in the rear area. Also, immediately prior to official stand-down announcement, DEROS curtailment instructions were received which required adjustments to the selected essential personnel list and, as a result, added to the personnel turbulence.

(3) **RECOMMENDATION**: As soon as practical after the unofficial standdown announcement is made, the redeploying unit should provide a list of personnel for immediate reassignment once the subordinate element arrives in its standdown area. The gaining units must be responsive to announced EDCSA, and personnel turbulence reduced to the lowest possible level.

(4) **COMMAND ACTION**: This requirement was included as a Lessons Learned in the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery After Action Report-Keystone Robin Charlie Redeployment.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

**DOWNGRADED AT 2 YEAR INTERVALS;  
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**AVGE-Y**

**SUBJECT:** Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery  
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

(1) **OBSERVATION:** At 290300 November 1970 a sapper attack was launched against Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery at FSB Simmons (XT 579504). The following specific observations were made:

(a) The interior guard of A/2-35 was ineffective, consisting of one man from FDC walking periodically throughout the battery area.

(b) No security was positioned on the west side of the battery position.

(c) Alternate means of intra-battery communications were lacking; once the land lines were disrupted the battery commander could not control the fires of the battery.

(d) A ready reaction force deployed immediately before anyone knew what was happening or before the force was ordered to deploy.

(e) Most of the assigned FDC personnel were in the immediate confines of the FDC bunker, to include the personnel who were off duty at the time of the attack. Thus, the entire FDC capability could have been nullified if the satchel charges were more effective.

(f) Class IV and Class V material was stored on the western edge of the FSB, giving additional cover and concealment to the enemy's entry into the FSB.

(g) Friendly defensive fires were not adequately controlled once the dust-off ship reported on station, resulting in a delay of 29 minutes.

(2) **EVALUATION:** At 290300 November 1970 a sapper attack was launched against Battery A, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery at FSB Simmons (XT 579504). The sappers used the usual techniques of placing bamboo to shore up the wire, wire cutting with essentially noiseless wirecutters, tying off trip flares to prevent their detonation and using RPG and satchel charges as their offensive weapons. Three sappers entered the FSB through a lightly guarded wire barrier on the western side of the base; this portion of wire could not be observed because of a depression in the terrain. Once inside the position area, the sappers moved into the vicinity of the FDC and hurled 2 plastic satchel charges into the FDC bunker resulting in one FADAC damaged, disruption of all land line communications, destruction of plotting equipment and wounding 5 FDC personnel. Since there were no other breaches in the wire, it appears that the sappers intended to exit by the same route. Once the charges in the FDC exploded, the entire battery was alerted of the attack. Several RPG rounds then impacted inside the perimeter, one of which is believed to have killed one of the sappers and wounded a second. With the personnel on the perimeter alerted, 5 additional sappers were killed in the ensuing defensive fires; a crew of three sappers armed with a RPG launcher and a supply of RPG rounds were killed while trying to approach the position from the north with the obvious mission of destroying nearby howitzers; the others were killed on their attempt to exit the battery

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AVGE-Y

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery  
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

position. Upon the initiative of the chiefs of section, the howitzers began firing their defensive fires in response to RPG indirect fire. The ready reaction force that quickly formed deployed prior to receiving an order to do so. Lastly, the 5 US WIA were dusted-off at 0357 hours, although the dust-off ship reported on station at 0326 hours. After checking in with the battery the dust-off ship made one pass to land but a howitzer fired a round and the pilot aborted thinking it was incoming artillery. On the next pass a flare was fired in the vicinity of the approaching aircraft and the pilot was temporarily blinded. Finally, all defensive fires were stopped and the pilot landed to pick-up the wounded personnel.

### (3) RECOMMENDATIONS:

(a) Batteries must have interior guards overlooking vital installations and sleeping bunkers, in addition to stationary guards at each howitzer section.

(b) Perimeter wire must be emplaced as specified by doctrine. Moreover, the perimeter wire must be inspected daily and improved as the situation dictates.

(c) Alternate means of intra-battery communications must be installed and checked daily.

(d) Ready reaction force must be instructed to deploy on order of the battery commander or his representative.

(e) Off duty FDC personnel must have sleeping bunkers that are separated from the FDC by a physical barrier or by an appropriate distance.

(f) Class IV and Class V material must be stored within the perimeter in such a way to deny the sappers cover and concealment as they attempt to breach the perimeter, yet positioned for troop safety.

(g) Batteries must develop and periodically rehearse plans to counter sapper attacks.

(h) FSB Commanders must have positive control of the defensive fires. Once a dust-off pilot is cleared for his approach into the position, he should not be forced to abort due to friendly firing.

(4) COMMAND ACTION: A interim Operational Report - Lessons Learned was published by 23d Artillery Group concerning the sapper attack against FSB Simmons on 29 November 1970. The report was disseminated immediately to all units throughout 23d Artillery Group.

d. Organization: None

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AVGE-Y

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery  
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

e. Training: None

f. Logistics:

(1) Administrative support requirements.

(a) OBSERVATION: When a large standdown/redeployment troop list is published, it is essential that TO&E items be deadlined for processing as soon as feasible. Equipment and vehicle support is required when processing TO&E items.

(b) EVALUATION: Equipment and vehicle support requirements were submitted early in the initial standdown phase but were not available to support the operation.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: Administrative support must be predetermined and available to facilitate the unit's operation. Required items should be obtained from depot stock or from Keystone resources on a temporary loan basis by the parent organization and hand receipted to the standdown/redeploying unit.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This requirement was included as a Lessons Learned in the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery After Action Report-Keystone Robin Charlie Redeployment.

(2) Property Book Officer for Equipment Escort Detachment.

(a) OBSERVATION: Control and accountability for all TO&E being redeployed must be obtained at the earliest possible date.

(b) EVALUATION: Six days prior to redeployment, the unit must provide a list of TO&E shortages to the gaining command. These items must be thoroughly inventoried early in the standdown phase to facilitate packing operations.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: A property book officer must be appointed in sufficient time to allow him to become familiar with the TO&E of the unit. This will greatly enhance the accountability inspection which is used to determine the required shortage list.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This requirement was included as a Lessons Learned in the 2d Battalion 35th Artillery After Action Report-Keystone Robin Charlie Redeployment.

g. Communications. None

h. Material. None.

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**CONFIDENTIAL****AVGE-Y****SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery  
Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFGR-65 (R3)**

1. Other. The impact of weather and weather support forecasting was not a major factor in the planning of operations during the reporting period.

*[Signature]*  
MOODY E. HAYES  
LTC, FA  
Commanding

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5 cys: 23d ARTY GP, ATTN: AVGE-C

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AVGE-C (6 Mar 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th  
Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)


DA, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96266

TO: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO 96266

1. This headquarters has reviewed the semi-annual report of the 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery and concurs in its content with the following exception.

2. Non-concur with paragraph 2f(1), Administrative support requirements. Temporary loan of equipment and vehicles from depot stock or from Keystone resources will only add to the maintenance and control requirements of the unit when it cannot afford an additional burden. This type of support can and has been provided to stand down/redeploying units during the latter stages of processing on an as-required basis. This mission support is normally provided by 23d Artillery Group units and Saigon Support Command to satisfy short term needs. In this manner the unit receives only necessary support and is not burdened with additional maintenance/control requirements.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
BERTRAM B. DALES  
MAJ, FA  
Adjutant

6

MACTR-G3PT (6 Mar 71) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 2d Battalion, 35th  
Artillery, for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 31 MAY 1971

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375


Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons  
Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion,  
35th Artillery.

2. (U) Comment follows: Reference item concerning administrative support  
requirements, page 5, para 2f (1), this headquarters supports the non-concur-  
rance of HQ, 23d Arty Gp.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
7 ROBERT F. CARRELL  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General

AVHDO-DO (6 Mar 71) 3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery  
Period Ending 30 April 1971 MCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 7 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JACK P. OOSE  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
TRAC


GPOP-FD (6 Mar 71) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion,  
35th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 JUN 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department  
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. O'NEAL  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG



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2. (C) Lessons learned: Commander's Observations, Evaluations, and Recommendations

a. Personnel: None

b. Intelligence:

(1) Unattended Ground Sensors.

(a) Observation: Due to the reduction of both US ground forces and the number of automatic weapons located at each FSB, a greater emphasis was placed on the early detection of enemy forces by magnetic and seismic intrusion devices.

(b) Evaluation: Since the withdrawal of US ground forces from FSB Katum in December, patrolling activity in that area has been limited to that performed by the 6th Ranger Group. In order to provide early warning and a greater reaction time, seismic intrusion devices (GSIDs) were requested and employed around the perimeter of that FSB. Subsequently, as more sensors became available, complete coverage was extended to each FSB occupied by a firing battery within this battalion. The worth of those sensors was demonstrated on the evening of 30 March 1971 at FSB Langard. Early in the evening, movement was detected by MINISIDS located outside the perimeter wire. The area was engaged; however, during the engagement, a firing incident occurred which resulted in ARVN casualties. Later that evening, another activation was recorded, but fear of a repeated incident delayed engagement of the activation. At approximately 310430 March 1971, the FSB received a sapper attack from the same direction of both activations. A captured sapper disclosed that both activations had been his unit and that the engagement of the first activation had wounded three sappers and caused the unit to withdraw and regroup. If the second activation had been engaged, the sapper attack may have been stopped again. Since that time, magnetic intrusion devices have been added to confirm the seismic activations.

(c) Recommendations: That more sensor strings capable of being monitored by a protatic from a central location be authorized and employed for FSB security to allow greater depth.

(d) Command Action: All firing units that employ unattended ground sensors have been instructed to engage all properly cleared sensor activations.

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AVC-9

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (2d Battalion, 32d Artillery)  
Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR 65 (R3)

## (2) CSR-III Radar.

(a) Observation: The experimental Camp Sentinel Radar III provides excellent area surveillance during the hours of darkness.

(b) Evaluation: The CSR-III Radar was initially employed at FSB Phu Dong II on 10 February 1971 and later at FSB Lanyard on 31 March 1971. This radar has been effective in confirming sensor activations, detecting movement in dense vegetation, alerting guard manned starlight scopes as to location of possible enemy movement, and denying the enemy use of natural camouflage. Targets have been detected between 100 to 1400 meters from the perimeter of the FSB's. When the close range at which some targets were detected prevented the use of artillery, M-79 grenades and .50 caliber fire from the Quads were placed on the target. This type of engagement has proved effective in some cases, however, an 81mm mortar fire would have been more appropriate in most instances. Some difficulties were initially experienced in the activations recorded by the radar, in that it was very difficult for the operators to distinguish between animal and personnel activations. When initially deployed at FSB Phu Dong II, a voluminous number of activations were recorded in and around the garbage dump which were duly engaged by the organic weapons of the battery. In an effort to determine the nature of these activations, an area around the dump was cleared and the ground smoothed to indicate foot or track prints. That night, the area was again very active according to the radar. The next morning, numerous animal tracks were found in the area. This, however, does not detract from the value of the radar. On numerous occasions, activations were recorded, the area engaged with an appropriate weapon system, and upon a search of the area the following morning, foot prints and blood trails have been found. As a case in point, one such engagement and search revealed a partially buried unfuzed mine located on Highway QL 22 north of FSB Phu Dong II with sandal tracks and blood trails leading into the woods. We have found that with experience, operators have been able to distinguish between animal and personnel type sensings. This radar has been instrumental in the prevention of attack on both FSB Phu Dong II and FSB Lanyard.

## (c) Recommendations:

(1) That each fire support base located in remote areas be equipped with a CSR-III Radar for base defense.

(2) That each using unit be given an 81mm mortar and associated ammunition, to include VT fuzes, to be employed against close-in targets.

(d) Command Action: This unit is currently attempting to obtain 81mm mortar for each of its firing batteries.

## c. Operations.

### (1) Support of ARVN Operations.

(a) Observation: The apparent reluctance of the ARVN to utilize

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AVGE-Q

30 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (2d Battalion, 32d Artillery)  
Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR 65 (R3)

heavy artillery for "close in" support was noted on several occasions during the reporting period.

(b) Evaluation: The firepower and shock effects of heavy artillery make it well suited for support of ground forces. Due to the large re-deployment of US ground forces within MA-3 during the reporting period, the vast majority of the fires delivered by this battalion have been for ARVN forces operating in Cambodia; however, most of these fires have been unobserved and delivered against intelligence targets developed by the battalion's higher headquarters. Very few of the missions indicated in paragraph 1c(26) have been for "close in" support of ARVN forces.

(c) Recommendations: In order to gain the ARVN's confidence in heavy artillery, we have instructed our liaison officers and fire direction officers in particular when co-located with an ARVN unit, to strive to familiarize the ARVN with the capabilities and limitations of heavy artillery. Personal tours of our FSBs, having the ARVN ground commander adjust the heavy artillery and witness its effect, and repeated volunteering to support a particular ARVN operation are a number of the methods utilized to overcome this problem.

- d. Organisation: None
- e. Logistics: None
- f. Communications: None
- g. Material: None
- h. Other: None

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as

*M. R. Whitaker*  
M. R. WHITAKER  
LTC, FA  
Commanding

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AVGE-C (30 Apr 71) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 32d  
Artillery for the Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR (R3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96266 19 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the semi-annual Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery and concurs with  
operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
BERTRAM B. DALES  
MAJ, FA  
Adjutant

MACTR-G3PT (30 Apr 71) 2d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned-of 2d Battalion, 32d  
Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 2 MAY 1971


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational  
Report - Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 30 April 1971  
from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
To ROBERT F. CARRELL Maj. ALC  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General

AVHDO-DO (30 April 71) 3rd Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned (2d Battalion, 32d Artillery)  
Period ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR 65 (R3)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 7 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery and concurs with comments of indorsing headquarters.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
JACK P. COOK  
CPT, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
TRAC  
2d Bn, 32d Arty


GPOP-FD (30 Apr 71) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned (2d Battalion,  
32d Artillery) Period Ending 30 April 1971,  
RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 23 JUN 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department  
of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

**CONFIDENTIAL****Organizational Structure****1. Organic Units**

- a. Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
- b. Battery A, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
- c. Battery B, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
- d. Battery C, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery
- e. Service Battery, 2d Battalion, 32d Artillery

**2. Attached Units**

- a. 5 M-55 (Quad 50) machine guns from "D" Battery, 71st Artillery are attached for operational control and common logistical support.
- b. CSR-III experimental radar is attached for common logistical support.
- c. Integrated Observation System (IOS) is attached for common logistical support.



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2. (C) **LESSONS LEARNED: COMMANDER'S OBSERVATION, EVALUATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS:**

(a) **Personnel:**

(1) **Battalion Drug Amnesty Program**

(a) **OBSERVATION:** The Drug Rehabilitation Program established by this Battalion in conjunction with the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, has produced some significant lessons learned.

(b) **EVALUATION:** During the period 1 November 1970 to 26 April 1971, the Battalion became involved in the drug amnesty program. Fifty-two patients were seen during this time, all physically addicted to heroin. Initially, patients were sent to the Pioneer House at II FFOCEV. Subsequently a rehabilitation facility was developed at Camp Frenzell Jones in conjunction with the 2d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. During the administration of the program several areas became apparent:

1. The best counselors for the program are non-ex-addict enlisted men, with some college-level training in the social and behavioral sciences, who are motivated to work in the program. Experience has shown that using ex-addicts is frequently unsuccessful, as many of these men return to the use of heroin while serving as counselors, thus defeating the purpose of the program.

2. The majority of men who became addicted to heroin in Vietnam did not use heroin in the states; although many experimented with marijuana, LSD, amphetamines, and/or barbiturates.

3. Although the majority of men seeking help through the program are motivated and successfully undergo detoxification (physical withdrawal), up to 80% of them return to the use of heroin. They attribute this to three things:

a. Continued craving for the drug (psychological addiction), which lasts from weeks to months.

b. Peer Pressure: When they return to their unit, many of their friends are still using heroin and encourage them to join them.

c. Recognized lack of an efficient means of legal drug suppression. The

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24-00000

26 April 1971

Operations Report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 21 Artillery  
for the Period Ending 26 April 1971, RGS CSFO-65 (R3) (U)

Majority of addicts interviewed have stated that the only way to stop the vicious use of heroin among US troops in Vietnam is to legally identify all users. There is no officially sanctioned, effective method of doing this at the present time. A urine test for heroin is available which, if used on a large-scale unannounced basis, would identify all heroin users. They could then be dealt with medically and/or administratively. Until such a proposal is accepted, it appears that dealing with the drug problem on a purely voluntary, medical basis will continue to be unsuccessful.

(a) RECOMMENDATION: That more attention be given to the internal operation of the Drug Amnesty Programs, where non-ex-addicts enlisted men are used as counselors, and that necessary means are devised to legally and timely identify those persons who are addicts or potential addicts of heroin.

b. Intelligence: None

c. Operations:

(1) Employment of the 23-inch xenon searchlight in interdiction operations along a river bank or waterway.

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of searchlights in the infrared mode along river banks for interdiction operations is ineffective.

(b) EVALUATION: During the period 18 November 1970 through 15 December 1970, two searchlights from Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery, assigned to 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery, were employed in an interdiction operation with the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment along the Song Dong Nai River. The searchlights were deployed at ambush points with M113 tracks of the supporting unit. It was discovered during this operation that the xenon searchlight used in the infrared mode proved to be ineffective due to the weather and atmospheric conditions along the river which distorted the vision and extremely limited the range of the infrared light. In addition, the sound of the jeep motor when operating the light distracts from the surprise capability of the ambush.

(c) RECOMMENDATION: That units employing the NMSS-3 searchlight set be made aware of the limitations of the infrared mode when operating the light in search missions over water, and areas where atmospheric conditions, such as fog, degrades the capability of the infrared.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: This limitation has been made known to units employing the lights along waterways.

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AVGE-J-C

26 April 1971

SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery  
for the Period Ending 26 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

(2) Employment of the 23-inch xenon searchlight in interdiction operations:

(a) OBSERVATION: The use of searchlights in interdiction operations using white light has been highly successful.

(b) EVALUATION: During the period 5 December 1970 through 3 January 1971, two searchlights were deployed on two hilltops overlooking a rice belt located between Vo Dat and FSB Dreamer. The lights were in support of a MACV Advisory Team at FSB Dreamer and elements of the 1st Cavalry Division (Air Mobile) at Vo Dat. The mission of the lights were to shine white light on call at selected and/or pre-designated points in the valley below. Their purpose was to assist in interception of NVA/VC in their attempt to obtain rice during the harvest. The lights proved to be highly successful in this type operation due to the range of the light and the wide and narrow beam capability. The lights were deployed above the rice field and in conjunction with radar.

(c) RECOMMENDATIONS: The use of the searchlight in interdiction operations utilizing white light and infrared (in areas where atmospheric conditions do not degrade the infrared capability) has proved to be highly successful and effective. In addition, the element of surprise adds to the effectiveness of the mission. Units employing searchlights should be made aware of the various capabilities of the AN/MSS-3 searchlight.

(d) COMMAND ACTION: The capabilities and limitations of the searchlight have been made known to units employing the lights in support of their missions.

d. Organization:

(1) Drawdown of Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery.

(a) OBSERVATION: Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery were reduced in authorized strength during Increment Five of standdown of units in UHARV.

(b) EVALUATION: As a result of the reduction in spaces imposed each of the batteries lost their command and control and administrative personnel. In both batteries only those personnel required to form complete combat crews were retained, in addition to a minimum number of mechanics. Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery retained one-hundred and twenty-two enlisted men; twenty-four (5) man crews and two artillery mechanics. Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery retained thirty-six enlisted men; sixteen (2) man crews and four searchlight mechanics. To alleviate the problem of command and control and administration of personnel and records, property books and equipment, the following was initiated: The crews with their weapons and equipment were

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26 April 1971

**SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery  
for the Period Ending 26 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)**

attached to the Duster batteries. As the Quads and/or Searchlights changed area of operations the personnel were detached from the former battery and attached to the battery having responsibility for that area of operation. Property book records, hand receipts and clothing forms were retained by the HNB Battery Commander, who maintained accountability for property in both Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery as an additional duty. The mechanics in Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery and the PLL of repair parts were controlled by the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery Battalion Maintenance Section. This procedure of retaining the mechanics, PLL, and responsibility for maintenance on the tactical assets at Battalion level allowed for an adequate density of five ton vehicles, 1/4 ton vehicles, M55 mounts and searchlights, to maintain a PLL for repair parts on the equipment. This procedure was established as the Duster batteries do not have the capability of maintaining the five ton prime mover, the M55 Quad .50 and the searchlights. This system once implemented and followed through was workable. However, the system devised to control the searchlights and Quads was cumbersome and was an attempt to substitute coordination by several elements for command by a single individual.

(c) **RECOMMENDATION:** In such a situation, responsibilities of individuals are very apt to become diffused. Since the unit is not authorized a battery commander, First Sergeant or platoon sergeant, the personnel assigned to the unit have no one individual to whom they could present their individual problems or who would look after their interests and provide them with support and guidance. The battery lacks unit integrity and the personnel are attached to different line batteries with which they are operating. Although the battery commanders of the line batteries make a sincere and honest effort to fill the void created by a lack of command and control element in the unit, satisfactory results are not always achieved. This is due to the fact that the attachment of forty to fifty or more personnel to the line battery creates an additional burden in control, operations and administration on that battery, and a burden which the battery is not equipped to handle. Thus, it is recommended that during a reduction of spaces in a unit, that unit should retain its command and control element. If the control element has to be eliminated, the entire unit should be inactivated or redeployed. TO&E units are designed to perform a specific mission, to tamper with the organizational structure, without an attendant analysis and restatement of the unit's mission creates severe command and management problems.

(d) **COMMAND ACTION:** The detail procedures of command and control of Battery D (MG) 71st Artillery and Battery I (SLT) 2d Battalion, 29th Artillery were implemented within this command through command letters and SOP's.

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AVGE-1-C 26 April 1971  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery  
for the Period Ending 26 April 1971, BCS CSPOR-65 (R3) (U)

- (e) TRAINING: None
- (f) LOGISTICS: None
- (g) COMMUNICATIONS: None
- (h) MATERIAL: None
- (i) OTHER: None

  
G. W. McINTYRE  
LTC, ADA  
Commanding

4 Incl  
A

**DISTRIBUTION:**

- 2 - USARPAC; ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96558
- 3 - USARV; ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375
- 1 - 23d Arty Gp; ATTN: AVGE-C APO 96266
- 1 - Bn File

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AVGE-C (26 Apr 71) 1st Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned


DA, HQ, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96266

7 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the semi-annual Operational Report - Lessons Learned of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP), 2d Artillery and concurs with operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
BERTRAM B. DALES  
MAJ, FA  
Adjutant

MACTR-G3PT (26 Apr 71) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Battalion (AW) (SP),  
2d Artillery, for Period Ending 26 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 2 JUN 1971


THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

(U) This headquarters has reviewed and concurs with the Operational  
Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from  
Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW) (SP), 2d Artillery.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



ROBERT F. CARRELL  
LTC, AGC  
Adjutant General

31  
AVHDO-DO (26 Apr 71) 3d Ind  
SUBJECT: Operational Report of the 5th Battalion (AW)(SP) 2d Artillery  
for the Period Ending 26 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 22 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 26 April 1971 from Headquarters, 5th Battalion (AW) (SP) 2d Artillery.

2. Reference item concerning "Battalion Drug Amnesty Program," page 21, paragraph 2a(1): Concur. The recommendations presented are being studied by USARV.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GERARD F. MACLAREN

CPT. INF.

Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
5/2d Arty  
TRAC



GPOP-FD (26 Apr 71) 4th Ind (U)

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned of 5th Bn (AW) 2d Arty, for  
the period ending 30 Apr 71, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 02 JUL 71


TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the  
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AG

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INCLOSURE 1 to Incl 3  
BATTALION ORGANIZATIONAL CHART  
AS OF 31 MARCH 1971

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN  
SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED  
INCLOSURES

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**DEPLOYMENT AND MISSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL  
UNITS OF 5TH BATTALION (AW)(SP) 2D ARTILLERY**

UNIT		Location of deployment as of 31 March 1971		MISSION
31	HMB	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	GS, 23d Arty Group
3	Task Force			
	Alpha	Phu Loi	YT 855160	GS, 23d Arty Group
48	Sec 12	FSB Haymaker	XU 699221	PS, RRF, CE
48	Sec 13	FSB Haymaker	XU 699221	PS, RRF, CE
36	Sec 14	FSB Wade	XU 733084	PS, RRF, CE
3	Sec 21	Phu Loi	XT 855160	Stand Down
3	Sec 22	Phu Loi	XT 855160	Stand Down
3	Sec 24	Phu Loi	XT 855160	Stand Down
48	Sqd 11-14	FSB Haymaker	XU 699221	PS, RRF, CE
31	Sqd 33-34	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
26	Sqd C-D	Bu Dop	XU 974291	PS
26	SLT 111	Bu Dop	XU 974291	PS
36	SLT 261	FSB Wade	XU 733084	PS
31	SLT 162	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
31	SLT 252	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
31	SLT 331	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
3	Task Force			
	Bravo	Phu Loi	XT 855160	GS, 23d Arty Group
34	Sec 11	FSB Lanyard	XT 075895	PS, RRF, CE
34	Sec 12	FSB Lanyard	XT 075895	PS, RRF, CE
49	Sec 13	FSB Happy	XT 007436	PS, RRF, CE
55	Sec 14	Phu Dong	XT 115708	PS, RRF, CE
35	Sec 21	Katum	XT 333902	PS, RRF, CE
32	Sec 22	FSB Blue	XT 259290	PS, RRF, CE
69	Sec 23	FSB St. Barbara	XT 276680	PS, RRF, CE
35	Sqd 31-54	Katum	XT 333902	PS, RRF, CE
39	Sqd 23-52	Tay Ninh	XT 165515	RRF, CE
54	Sqd 43-44	FSB Lanyard	XT 075895	PS, RRF, CE
69	Sqd 62-63	FSB St. Barbara	XT 276680	PS, RRF, CE
55	Sqd 64-P	Phu Dong	XT 115708	PS, RRF, CE
31	Sqd 41-61	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
31	SLT 112	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
32	SLT 132	FSB Blue	XT 259290	PS
69	SLT 211	FSB St. Barbara	XT 276680	PS
49	SLT 242	FSB Happy	XT 007436	PS
35	SLT 312	Katum	XT 333902	PS
2	Task Force			
	Charlie	Camp Price	YT 045116	GS, 23d Arty Group
56	Sec 11	FSB Dora	YS 251726	PS, RRF, CE
2	Sec 12	Camp Price	YT 045116	Stand Down

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
UNIT	Location of deployment as of 31 March 1971		MISSION
46 Sec 13	FSB Carmen	YS 422582	PS, RRF, CE
13 Sec 21	FSB Blackhorse	YS 445977	PS, RRF, CE
47 Sec 24	FSB Carol	YT 295100	PS, RRF, CE
47 SLT 122	FSB Carol	YT 295100	PS
31 Task Force Delta	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	GS, 23d Arty Group
51 Sec 11	FSB Sylvia	ZS 015827	PS, RRF, CE
88 Sec 12	FSB Old Ham	ZT 082000	PS, RRF, CE
89 Sec 13	FSB Margaret	YT 741291	PS, RRF, CE
89 Sec 14	FSB Margaret	YT 741291	PS, RRF, CE
68 Sec 21	FSB Olesen	YT 657067	PS, RRF, CE
6 Sec 22	FSB Deeble	YT 950263	PS, RRF, CE
29 Sec 23	FSB Michelle	YT 285100	PS, RRF, CE
8 Sec 24	FSB Nancy	YT 560381	PS, RRF, CE
88 Sqd 13-21	FSB Old Ham	ZT 082000	PS, RRF, CE
6 Sqd A-8	FSB Deeble	YT 950263	PS
31 Sqd 53-B	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
31 SLT 222	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
31 SLT 231	Camp Frenzell Jones	YT 075120	Maint Stand Down
8 SLT 262	FSB Nancy	YT 560381	PS
5 SLT 332	FSB Deeble	YT 950263	PS
88 SLT 341	FSB Old Ham	ZT 082000	PS

**Mission Key:**

PS - Perimeter Security  
RRF - Ready Reaction Force  
CE - Convoy Escort

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III FORCEV~III CTZ AREA OF OPERATIONS



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KEY TO INCLOSURE 3  
5TH BATTALION (AW)(SP) 2D ARTILLERY  
SUMMARY OF POSITIONS OCCUPIED  
DURING THE PERIOD 1 NOVEMBER 1971 - 26 APRIL 1971

1. Duster Compound	YT 128114	44. FSB Asper	YT 488129
2. Camp Price	YT 045116	45. Dong Xoi	YT 091762
3. Phu Loi	XT 865160	46. FSB Carmen	YS 442582
4. Cu Chi	XT 650160	47. FSB Carol	YT 295100
5. Xuan Loc	YT 474096	48. FSB Haymaker	XU 699221
6. FSB Deeble	YT 950263	49. FSB Happy	XT 007439
7. FSB Flower	ZS 004984	50. FSB Simmons	XT 582501
8. FSB Nancy	YT 560381	51. FSB Sylvia	ZS 015827
9. FSB Mateel	XU 715278	52. FSB Powder Ridge	YT 818788
10. FSB Mace	YT 627111	53. FSB Clare	YT 820453
11. Nui Dat	YS 433667	54. FSB Susannah	YS 495985
12. FSB Lynch	YS 458836	55. Phu Dong	XT 118708
13. FSB Blackhorse	YS 445977	56. FSB Dora	YS 251752
14. FSB Mance	YS 125895	57. Lai Khe	XT 761377
15. FSB Schwartz	YS 380991	58. FSB Striker	YS 813966
16. Nha Be	XS 920820	59. Bearcat	YS 163001
17. Tan An Bridge	XS 656583	60. Vo Dat	YT 721341
18. Ben Luc Bridge	XS 617759	61. FSB Heidi	YT 510052
19. Phu Cuong Bridge	XT 808137	62. FSB Rivers	YS 101872
20. FSB Arles	XT 515665	63. FSB Libby	YU 535338
21. FSB Ha No	YU 022342	64. FSB Alpha	XU 568215
22. Phuoc Vinh	XT 985490	65. FSB Williams	XT 956726
23. LZ Buttons	YU 140070	66. FSB Sunday Punch	YU 395477
24. Duc Phong	YU 436048	67. FSB Green	YT 334784
25. FSB Smuffy	YU 336362	68. FSB Olesen	YT 657067
26. Bu Dop	XU 974291	69. FSB St. Barbara	XT 276680
27. FSB Audie	YU 483295	70. FSB Lisa	YT 510056
28. FSB Dragonhead	YT 684967	71. FSB Dacus	YT 202570
29. FSB Michelle	YT 283100	72. FSB Gemini	YS 143856
30. FSB Snider	XT 696195	73. FSB Stew	YS 117956
31. Camp Frennell-Jones	YT 075120	74. FSB Dreamer	YT 932262
32. FSB Blue	XT 258290	75. FSB Jupiter	YT 473492
33. FSB Eisenberg	XT 114495	76. FSB Burnard	YT 270880
34. FSB Langard	XT 075895	77. FSB Apache	YT 737245
35. Katun	XT 333902	78. FSB Beverly	YS 458858
36. FSB Wade	XU 733084	79. FSB Cheyenne	YT 982536
37. FSB Sandra	XT 049193	80. Dau Tieng	XT 494447
38. FSB Silver	YT 828040	81. FSB Riviera	YS 990838
39. Tay Ninh	XT 165515	82. FSB Jeanne	YU 588177
40. Camp Dell	YT 934263	83. FSB Nelson	YT 032650
41. FSB Buell	XT 216534	84. FSB Custer	YT 375158
42. FSB Marisa	YT 415230	85. NDP	YT 386262
43. FSB Custer	XT 945395	86. NDP	YT 301257
		87. Suni Da	XT 330575
		88. FSB Old Man	XT 082000
		89. FSB Margaret	YT 741291

Appendix 1 to Inclosure 3

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**DEPLOYMENT AND MISSIONS OF INDIVIDUAL  
ELEMENTS OF BATTERY D (MG) 71ST ARTILLERY**

UNIT	Location of deployment as of 1 April 1971	MISSION
1 Btry D (MG) 71st Arty	Camp Frensell Jones	YT 075120 Assigned to 23d Arty Group
48 Sgd 11-14	FSB Haymaker	XU 699221 PS, RPF, CE
88 Sgd 13-21	FSB Old Ham	ZT 082000 PS, RRF, CE
36 Sgd 22-41	FSB Wade	XU 733084 PS, RRF, CE
49 Sgd 23-52	FSB Happy	XU 007439 PS, RRF, CE
35 Sgd 31-54	Katum	XT 333902 PS, RRF, CE
8 Sgd 33-34	FSB Nancy	YT 560381 PS, RRF, CE
34 Sgd 43-44	FSB Lanyard	XT 075895 PS, RRF, CE
1 Sgd 53-E	Camp Frensell Jones	YT 075120 Maint Stand Down
32 Sgd 62-63	FSB Blue	XT 258290 PS, RRF, CE
55 Sgd 64-F	Phu Dong	XT 118708 PS, RRF, CE
6 Mt A-B	FSB Deeble	YT 950263 PS
26 Mt C-D	Bu Dop	XU 974291 PS

**Mission Key:**

PS - Perimeter Security  
RRF - Ready Reaction Force  
CE - Convoy Escort

Inclosure 4 to Incl 3

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**2. (C) Lessons Learned: Commander's Observation, Evaluation, Recommendations and Command Action taken:**

**a. Personnel: None**

**b. Intelligence:**

(1) Observation: The major problem area affecting Fire Support Base Security is the lack of adequate detection devices, particularly during the hours of darkness. Individual and crew served weapons authorized under the Firing Battery TOE are adequate to repel ground attacks once detected. It is the opinion of this headquarters that perimeter lighting devices are the

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DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.  
DOD DIR 5200.10**



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**AVGE-R**

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)**

best means available for detecting ground probes under conditions of poor visibility or darkness. During the reporting period, this battalion employed various illumination devices at Fire Support Bases to include:

- (a) Diesel Pots - a 40mm ammunition container, filled with diesel, will burn for approximately 3 to 4 hours.
- (b) Hush Flares - when detonated, a Hush Flare will burn for approximately six hours.
- (c) Self Illumination with 155mm Howitzer Illuminating Projectiles.
- (d) Hand flares.
- (e) Searchlight Vehicles.

(2) Evaluation: The employment of a continuous illuminating device, covering the entire length of the external wire system, provides an excellent detection means, discourages sappers from attempting to breach the perimeter, and raises the morale of the personnel on the Fire Support Base.

(3) Recommendation: That lightweight, portable, battery or generator powered lighting devices be made available through the supply system, for use on Fire Support Bases.

(4) Command Action: This battalion will begin experimenting with vehicle headlights, powered by 12v DC batteries to provide the continuous illumination required on the Fire Support Base. This battalion has also requested portable lighting devices through the supply system, however these devices were not available at the end of the reporting period.

**c. Operations:**

(1) Observation: On 5 Dec 70, Battery B, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery replaced Battery C, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery at Fire Support Base Snuffy. Battery B had previously supported the 5th ARVN Division Artillery, and was now assigned a mission of GSR, 1st Cavalry Division (AM) Artillery. The battery immediately became involved in firing GAP (Ground and Air Preparations) missions for air mobile insertions of elements of the 5/7 Cavalry, 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division (AM). The GAP mission requires extremely close coordination between the elements involved, and precise timing in firing, as the airmobile force approaches the landing zone.

(2) Evaluation: Battery B failed to meet these standards during the firing of its first GAP mission. This obvious failure resulted from a lack of experience on the part of Key battery personnel in firing the type GAP mission required by the 1st Cavalry Division (AM). Battery B had not fired this type mission prior to occupying Fire Support Base Snuffy.

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AVGE-R

**SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)**

(3) Recommendation: That any artillery battery, prior to or upon closing into a new position area, coordinate with the Maneuver Force Commander for simulated and live training in missions peculiar to the new location. Immediate training of this type will insure effective coordination and precise timing when fires are requested in an actual combat situation.

(4) Command Action: This battalion has implemented the above recommendation with total success and will preclude future incidents of the type mentioned.

d. Organization: None

e. Training: None

f. Logistics: None

g. Communications: None

h. Materiel:

(1) Maintenance program for 155mm Howitzer M114A1.

(a) Observation: The 155mm Howitzers, M114A1, assigned to this battalion have experienced numerous component failures due to age, environment, and extensive use. Replacement components have been available through the supply system in sufficient time to preclude excessive maintenance down time.

(b) Evaluation: Individual component failures often initiate a sequence of failures of major howitzer parts to include recoil systems, elevating and traversing mechanisms, brake systems, sight mounts etc. The howitzer is then unsafe to fire or move.

(c) Recommendations: An R&R program for the M114A1 Howitzer was initiated by the 185th Maintenance Battalion on 2 Jan 1971. It is recommended that additional float M114A1 Howitzers be made available from resources of stand down units, to allow complete overhaul of all primary weapons in this battalion. This overhaul program should be completed at the earliest possible date to insure safety in firing, and successful accomplishment of the fire support mission.

(d) Command Action: An R&R program for the M114A1 Howitzer was initiated on 2 Jan 1971. One float howitzer was made available. The float howitzer has been used however, to replace deadlined tubes at Fire Support Base locations detracting from the R&R program. Additional float weapons are required to effect successful completion of the program at the earliest possible date.

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AVGE-R

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned. Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R2) (U)

(2) Airlift Rigging Techniques

(a) Observation: On 26 Jan 1971, during an airlift move from FSB Snuffy to FSB Sunday Punch, one of two loads of class V, cluster rigged, was dropped by a CH-47 helicopter, approximately one kilometer south of FSB Sunday Punch. The load had been inspected prior to take-off by a Pathfinder, the Battery Commander, and the Flight Engineer. It was determined to be secure for airlift by all personnel concerned.

(b) Evaluation: The two loads had been cluster rigged, (both loads suspended from the hook on the CH-47) however, the heavier load of projectiles was suspended by a 20' sling, while the lighter load of powder was suspended by an 11' sling. Due to flight movement, the 20' sling rubbed excessively against the powder cannisters and pallets of the upperload causing the sling to deteriorate and break.

(c) Recommendations: That when cluster rigging a double load for airlift, both loads be suspended from the aircraft by the same length sling. If it becomes necessary to utilize different length slings, the heavier load should be positioned higher than the lighter load, and the longer sling should be taped in the areas in which friction will likely develop.

(d) Command Action: The above recommendations were immediately implemented.

1 Incl  
Annex A w/d HQ DA

*Thomas P. Ravetta*  
THOMAS P. RAVETTA  
LTC, FA  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

2 CG, USARPAC, ATTN: GPOP-DT  
3 CG, USARV, ATTN: AVHDO-DO  
5 CO, 23d Arty Gp, ATTN: AVGE-C

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AVGE-C (1 May 71) 1st Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 12th  
Artillery for Period Ending 30 April 1971. RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

DA, HEADQUARTERS, 23D ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96266 14 MAY 1971

TO: Commanding General, Third Regional Assistance Command, APC 96266

This headquarters has reviewed the semi-annual Operational Report -  
Lessons Learned of the 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery and concurs with  
operations and lessons learned during the reporting period.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Bertram B. Dales*  
BERTRAM B. DALES  
MAJ, FA  
Adjutant

**CONFIDENTIAL**

MACTR-G3PT (1 May 71) 2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery  
for Period Ending 30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

HQ, Third Regional Assistance Command, APO San Francisco 96266 5 JUN 1971

THRU: Commanding General, US Army Vietnam, ATTN: AVHDO-DO, APO 96375

Commander-In-Chief, US Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-DT, APO 96538

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D.C. 20310

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report - Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery.

2. (C) Comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning lighting for Fire Support Bases, page 12, paragraph 2b; concur. Currently there are no light sets available through the supply system. However, sufficient lighting fixtures and wiring have been obtained through PDO and depot to light the 23d Arty Gp's Fire Support Bases. Generators to power the lighting systems have been issued on temporary loan from the supply depot.

b. Reference item concerning additional float 155mm howitzers, page 14, paragraph 2h; nonconcur. There are presently two 155mm howitzers, M114A1, issued as floats to support the R&R program for the two 155mm howitzer battalions in the 23d Arty Gp. The float howitzers are used to support the R&R program and to replace howitzers that cannot be immediately repaired. Using this system, the deadline rate for 155mm howitzers has been consistently below 2% and normally closer to 0%. When the float howitzer is issued, the unserviceable howitzer has all the necessary repairs completed before it is returned to the unit. In addition, the supporting unit does not have sufficient personnel or the capability to maintain more than the two float howitzers presently on hand.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

  
KENNETH A. PAYANT  
Major, AGC  
Assistant Adjutant General

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**CONFIDENTIAL**

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A/HDO-DO (1 May 71) 3rd Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned. Headquarters, 2d Battalion,  
12th Artillery, Period Ending 30 April 1971 RCS CSFOR-65 (R3) (U)

Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, APO San Francisco 96375 15 JUN 1971

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-FD,  
APO 96558

1. This Headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 30 April 1971 from Headquarters, 2d Battalion, 12th Artillery and comments of indorsing headquarters.

2. Reference item concerning "Aircraft Rigging Techniques," page 15, paragraph 2h(2). Regardless of which load is on the longer sling, friction will still develop that will cause the sling to fray. TM 55-450-12 recommends using slings of equal lengths when moving cluster loads. Unit has been so advised.

FOR THE COMMANDER:



GEDDES, F. MACLAREN

CPT. INF.

Acting Asst Adjutant General

Cy furn:  
2/12th Arty  
TRAC


GPOP-FD (1 May 71) 4th Ind (U)  
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned, Headquarters  
2d Battalion, 12th Artillery, Period Ending  
30 April 1971, RCS CSFOR-65 (R3)

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 1 JUL 1971

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development,  
Department of the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters concurs in subject report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



L.M. OZAKI  
CPT, AGC  
Asst AS

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UNCLASSIFIED

Security Classification

## DOCUMENT CONTROL DATA - R &amp; D

(Security classification of title, body of abstract and indexing annotation must be entered when the overall report is classified)

1. ORIGINATING ACTIVITY (Corporate author)

HQ, DAJD, Washington, D. C. 20310

2a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

2b. GROUP

4

3. REPORT TITLE

Operational Reports - Lessons Learned, Artillery Units - 2d Bn, 35th Arty, 2d Bn, 32d Arty, 5th Bn, 2d Arty, and 2d Bn, 12th Arty for Period Ending 30 April 1971.

4. DESCRIPTIVE NOTES (Type of report and inclusive dates)

Experiences of unit engaged in counterinsurgency operations, 1 Nov 70 to 30 Apr 71.

5. AUTHOR(S) (First name, middle initial, last name)

CO's, 2d Bn, 3th Arty, 2d Bn, 32d Arty, 5th Bn, 2d Arty, and 2d Bn, 12th Arty.

6. REPORT DATE

March, April &amp; May

7a. TOTAL NO. OF PAGES

43

7b. NO. OF REFS

8a. CONTRACT OR GRANT NO.

8b. ORIGINATOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S)

9. PROJECT NO.

DAJD

711001

711002

711029

711024

c.

N/A

9b. OTHER REPORT NO(S) (Any other numbers that may be assigned this report)

10. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

N/A

12. SPONSORING MILITARY ACTIVITY

DAJD, Washington, D. C. 20310

13. ABSTRACT

9

DD FORM 1473  
1 NOV 65

UNCLASSIFIED

(This page is unclassified) Security Classification